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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (27 Feb 69) FOR OT UT 684232

6 March 1969

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Reports~~ Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, ~~Period Ending 31 October 1968~~ (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter. (11) 13 Nov 68 (2) 38p.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

(19) *Transmitted Sept for quarterly period ending 31 Oct 68.*

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
APO San Francisco 96384

AVCA GO-H

13 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
APO 96375


Commander in Chief
United States Army, Pacific
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20315

The Operational Report of this headquarters for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 is forwarded in accordance with Army Regulation 525-15 and USARV Regulation 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as


ED V. HENDREN, JR.
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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A. (U) COMMAND GROUP. Distinguished visitors to Headquarters 1st Logistical Command are indicated at Inclosure 9. The Commanding General, Major General Jos. M. Heiser, Jr., assumed command of the 1st Logistical Command on 2 August 1968. Chief of Staff, Colonel Frank A. Gleason, Jr., was assigned from U.S. Army Europe. Brigadier General Leo B. Jones, Deputy Commanding General, was reassigned to Headquarters, U.S. Army Vietnam. Continued command emphasis was placed on logistics management and reduction of stockage. Particular attention was given to the input of stocks from CONUS through the institution of Project STOP/SEE. Special emphasis was placed on the validation of the data base of the depots and Inventory Control Center, Vietnam (ICCV) through an accelerated inventory action called Project COUNT. The goal of 50 percent stock removal from the 506th Field Depot to the U.S. Army Depot, Long Binh by 30 September 1968 was exceeded by some 1,120 short tons.

B. (U) ACofS, COMPTROLLER, Annex A. On 21 August 1968, the Commanding General increased the staffing of the ACofS, Comptroller in order to establish management programs in the areas of management analysis, cost reduction, internal review, and Automatic Data Processing. The Fiscal Year 1969 cost ceiling of this command was reduced as of 1 October 1968 from \$175.4 million to \$168.2 million. The obligation rate for Operations and Maintenance, Army (O&MA) funds as of 30 September 1968 was 35.2 percent. As of 30 September 1968, Active Interservice Support Agreements had a total estimated value of \$12,984,554 monthly. In September 1968, the Command Management Information System was instituted to report the status of short-range command objectives. On 9 October 1968, the United States Army Audit Agency (USAAA) validated a cost reduction action (Reduction of Order Ship Time for Meal Combat Individual) for \$1.637 million. On 21 October 1968, all military pay certificates (MPC) in Vietnam were converted to a new series. On 1 August 1968, Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam (USARV) assumed operational control of the separate finance sections assigned to the 1st Logistical Command and assigned the Central Finance and Accounting Office (CF&AO) to this command, less operational control. On 1 October 1968, the separate finance sections were reassigned to this command and the CF&AO was reassigned to USARV.

C. (C) ACofS, PERSONNEL, Annexes B,C,D, and E. Significant civil affairs activities included the continued progress of the Long Binh Post People-to-People Program, the successful implementation of Annex Q (Civic Action) to 1st Logistical Command OPORD 1-68, the development of programs of assistance to Vietnamese scouting and the Vietnamese Animal Husbandry Program, and the continued efforts by all subordinate commands in the conducting of military civic actions and community relations programs. The present command strength is 49,781 which represents 91.2 percent of authorized strength. The Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) for this headquarters has been completed and forwarded to Headquarters, USARV. TDA's for U.S. Army Support Commands, Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Qui Nhon are nearing completion. Modified TDA's for command depots

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were submitted to Headquarters, USAFV on 15 September 1968. Headquarters, USAFV will submit all four TDA's as a single circuit closing package. During the reporting period there was an increase of 20 clubs and messes. The Officers, NCO, and EM Clubs in Cam Ranh Bay were completed and opened for business on 26 October 1968. The Army motor vehicle accident frequency rate increased 12.3 percent and the military injury rate decreased 4 percent. During the reporting period, more aggressive command actions were taken and numerous command directives were published to bring about a significant reduction in accidents. Present Department of the Army Civilian (DAC) strength is 318. As of 31 October, 2,228 Local Nationals have been hired under Program 6 Civilianization. This figure represents 48 percent of the total objective of 4,686 Local Nationals to be hired by 31 May 1969.

D. (C) ACOFS, SECURITY, PLANS AND OPERATIONS, Annexes F, G, and H.

1. Security Division, Annex F. Hostile forces conducted 20 major attacks which affected this command: eight convoy ambushes, five stand off attacks, five attacks against POL pipelines and two attacks against shipping. On 29 October 1968, 1st Logistical Command Regulation 380-2 was published establishing procedures to insure that secure methods are used when requisitioning and marking supplies designated for special combat operations. On 31 October 1968, 1st Logistical Command Regulation 381-1 was published establishing procedures for increasing the overall security within the command through emphasis on security orientations, reporting procedures, and investigations of incidents of subversion and espionage directed against the US Army, to include the deliberate compromise of classified information. During the reporting period, the number of personnel security clearance actions increased by 42 percent over the May-July 68 period. This increase was due partially to the program of validating and verifying Department of the Army Civilian security clearances which was started during the last reporting period.

2. Plans and Force Development Division, Annex G. A representative of this division participated in a United States Army, Pacific (USARPAC) meeting from 21-23 October 1968, to discuss requirements for OPLAN 67-69 (U). A regulation is being developed by this division to define responsibilities of units processing for redeployment through support command ports. From 11 to 19 October 1968, U.S. Army Material Command representatives visited this headquarters and the support commands to assess potential capabilities for supporting OPLAN 67-69 (U). 1st Logistical Command Circular 310-32, regarding temporary loans and turn-in of non-mission essential TOE/TDA equipment was distributed on 30 August 1968. 1st Logistical Command Circular 310-4, Preparation of TOE/MTOE Authorization Documents, was distributed on 27 October 1968. Studies are being conducted regarding truck unit equipment requirements for convoy and security. Equipment sections of 1st Logistical Command Depot MTDA's were submitted to USAFV. TDA's are being prepared for government owned contractor operated (GOCO)

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equipment. A total of 12 MTOE's covering 21 separate units were prepared and forwarded to USARV, G-3. Concept development for organizational structure of the U.S. Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay is in process. Organizational structures for transportation units in the U.S. Army Support Commands, Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay are under study. Program 6 Civilianization Plan was revised to reduce cost of general support maintenance contracts.

3. Operations Division, Annex H. During the month of August the deployment of the first increment of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF) was completed. With the departure of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment (RTAVR) (Queen's Cobra Regiment) the total number of Thai personnel in country was approximately 5,562. The second increment of the RTAVF, totaling 5,704 personnel, is scheduled to arrive in January-February 1969. This will complete the deployment of the Royal Thai Black Panther Division to Vietnam. There were no other major unit arrivals in which 1st Logistical Command was involved during the months of August, September and October. Airdrop resupply activities of the 1st Logistical Command involved 47 emergency airdrop missions and the delivery of 1,497.21 short tons of Classes I, III, IV, and V supplies. The majority of resupply was delivered in the III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) to Katum and Thieu Ngon. A total of 20 tactical operations were supported by this command during August, September and October. At the end of October, 14 were still in progress. Six Forward Support Areas (FSA's) have been established to support tactical operations. Enemy activity was at a low ebb throughout the period. However, a total of 28 convoys were ambushed; 9 in August, 14 in September and 5 in October. The Logistics-Over-The-Shore facility at Wunder Beach was phased out during the months of September and October. This was necessitated by the unfavorable weather conditions anticipated during the months October through March. The Rapid Arrow program has worked well in IV Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). Similar plans have been initiated in II and III CTZ's.

E. (U) DIRECTORATE OF AMMUNITION, Annex I. One Ordnance Battalion, two Ordnance Companies and two Ordnance Detachments (EOD) arrived in country during the period, thereby enhancing ammunition supply and service capability in 1st Logistical Command. Ban Me Thout Forward Support Area became operational during September, increasing storage capacity of the U.S. Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay by nearly 2,000 tons. A team of Computer Sciences Corporation personnel is developing a system to automate the ammunition stock control system.

F. (U) DIRECTORATE OF ENGINEERING, Annexes J, K, and L. During the last two weeks of October, preparations were made to reorganize the Directorate of Engineering to become the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Services, effective 1 November 1968.

1. Facilities Division, Annex J. The realigned Fiscal Year 1969 Military Construction, Army program was approved by USARV. Priorities of all 1st Logistical Command projects were reviewed at a conference held at USARV and priorities were raised for several projects. The Facilities Status Report was updated and its format changed to show additional information needed for managing major logistical facilities throughout Vietnam and for planning required construction. Several instances of unauthorized construction were discovered and commanders at all levels were reminded of proper documentation and approval procedures to obtain needed facilities. The concept of establishing a sub-depot at Vung Tau was re-evaluated and discarded in favor of establishing an expanded DSU. The resultant lowered stockage objectives made it necessary to reduce the scope of construction previously approved for Vung Tau. The proposal made to USARV to use Southeast Asia huts in lieu of framed tents was approved; the huts are more durable and less expensive. Southeast Asia huts have now been authorized for upgrading of framed tents throughout Vietnam, with emphasis on replacing those in I CTZ.

2. Engineering Division, Annex K. Information was disseminated to all 1st Logistical Command units describing how to construct permanent earth filled bin type revetments and bunkers at a considerable savings compared to sandbag structures. Policies and procedures for use of landmines by 1st Logistical Command units were published in 1st Logistical Command Regulation 525-4. Vertical construction at the U.S. Army Depot, Long Binh progressed ahead of schedule. Six additional buildings were occupied, and 27 vertical structures are in various stages of construction. Overall percentages of facilities completed and in use are: covered storage - 32 percent, administrative and operations buildings - 23 percent, open storage - 73 percent, roads and operational areas - 45 percent. Criteria were developed for stabilization of ammunition storage pad berms.

3. Operations Division, Annex L. The number of 1st Logistical Command Job Order Requests (JOR) for administrative approval by this office has decreased greatly from past periods. A program to construct parking lots at fourteen locations in II, III, and IV CTZs for Sea Land refrigerated vans was initiated. The Directorates of Food, Transportation and Engineering are working on this program which will provide throughput capability for delivery of food. On 27 September 1968, a meeting with Navy representatives was held to modify the current Repair and Utilities (R&U) support Inter-service Support Agreements (ISSA's). A study was made of the operations, personnel and equipment of the five engineer industrial gas generating detachments in country. In coordination with the U.S. Army Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam (USAECV) and the Directorate of General Supply, an investigation of R&U base power generators is being conducted. The function of redistributing excess Raymond Morrison Knudsen - Brown Root James (RMK-BRJ) assets was transferred from this office to the ICCV. Repairs and utilities (R&U) support in remote locations has become a problem for 1st Logistical

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Command units at Forward Support Areas (FSA's). On 22 September 1968, the 71st QM platoon was transferred from U.S. Army Support Command, Qui Nhon to U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang; elements of the 304th Supply and Service Company and the 19th Supply and Service Company were returned from U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang to the U.S. Army Support Command, Qui Nhon. A U.S. Army Mobility Equipment Command equipment specialist, Mr. Yueil E. Chandler, Jr., visited laundry sites throughout South Vietnam during the period August through October 1968. The primary accomplishment of these visits was the establishment and implementation of a functional Prescribed Load List (PLL).

G. (U) DIRECTORATE OF FOOD, Annex M. The new 28 day Master Menu, SB 10-261, was implemented on 8 September 1968. Significant advantages over the old 28 day Master Menu include the deletion of many of the canned meat items with the addition of fresh frozen meats, a greater variety of menu items and reduction of the less acceptable items. A food service booklet describing the proper sanitary procedures necessary for hygienic food preparation has been published and distributed to all 1st Logistical Command Field Ration Messes and non-appropriated fund messing facilities. The contents of the booklet are bilingual so that local national employees and third country mess personnel can take advantage of the information. Milk and ice cream from the Meadow Gold Dairy Plant at Cam Ranh Bay are being shipped to Vung Tau and Saigon to alleviate the shortfall in that area. Consideration is being given to a proposal to construct a contractor financed dairy products and dry ice plant at Long Binh. Such a plant would result in an annual savings of approximately \$3.1 million after amortization. The mobile bakery plant at Tuy Hoa was deadlined on 17 October 1968. Bakery support for Tuy Hoa is now being provided from the mobile bakery at Nha Trang. The order ship time for Meals, Combat, Individual was reduced from 180 days to 165 days. This resulted in a cost reduction savings of \$1,637,400. A reduction in the order ship time for refrigerated and non-refrigerated subsistence will be placed into effect with the November 1968 requisitioning cycle.

H. (C) DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL SUPPLY, Annex N. During the reporting period, the Directorate of General Supply merged with the U.S. Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam (USAICCV). A number of management tools were initiated to improve the efficiency of the supply system and to reduce costs. Project Stop was a one-time cancellation of shipments of items which were due-in, but not needed. Additional actions were taken under Project Stop/Expanded to stop the unnecessary flow of unneeded supplies into Vietnam. All of the materiel for which the requisitions were cancelled could not be stopped immediately due to being at various points in the supply system. Project STOP/SEE was instituted to frustrate or divert shipments of unneeded materiel prior to arrival in RVN and, identify for return, those shipments which were not able to be diverted. Project COUNT was established to improve the inventory data base by means of a wall-to-wall inventory at each of the supply activities from DSU/GSU to depot level. Project National Cash Register (NCR) 500 CLEAN

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was a one-time purification of ledger cards at DSU/GSU level effected through a reconciliation with supported units. Non-demand supported, mission essential items were turned in as part of the authorized stockage list (ASL) reduction program. An intensive program was established to reduce the high number of backorders through the elimination of unneeded items under Project RAGS. Evacuation of excesses is being expedited through Project THRU-PUT. Emphasis is being placed on those lines receiving the most demands through Project FILL. Project FILL is being launched to improve the supply posture of those items that are difficult to obtain or are at zero balance and which therefore affect the combat readiness of the tactical units. An order ship time (OST) study was conducted to determine requisitioning objective (RO) requirements for improved customer satisfaction. Plans were developed for the support of the M551, scheduled for deployment during the calendar year 1969. The life expectancy of batteries should be greatly increased and a considerable savings should result from Project ORANGE BALL. The IBM 7010/1460 computers arrived at U.S. Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay, on 9 August and are now operational. U.S. Army Support Command, Qui Nhon received its IBM 7010/1460 computer on 23 September, but is experiencing generator difficulties. The IBM 1460 computer for the 4th Transportation Command arrived in country on 16 October 1968. Micromation equipment has been installed at the USAICCV and is now operational.

I. (U) DIRECTORATE OF MAINTENANCE, Annex O. The Command Maintenance Inspection Teams conducted a total of 59 inspections within the four support command areas. The teams conducted Roadside Spotcheck Inspections of 1122 vehicles. The Marine Maintenance Activities Division initiated a monthly update to the Fiscal Year 1969 program for vessel overhaul. A contract was let for engine rebuild to provide the necessary skilled labor which is lacking in the US Army Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam (USAMMAV). A one year supply of repair parts arrived for the maintenance of Johnson Outboard Motors, the Patrol Boat River (PBR), and Hurricane Aircat Boats, which were procured under project ENSURE (Expediting Nonstandard Urgent Requirements for Equipment). The Directorate is trying to obtain a sufficient number of US Army watercraft to support Department of the Army maintenance and operational requirements. The condition of vessels returning from overhaul continues to improve and turn-around time lapse is much less.

J. (C) DIRECTORATE OF PETROLEUM, Annex P. Military bulk petroleum deliveries to 1st Logistical Command terminals in Vietnam continued at the normal rate; commercial deliveries of military product continued to improve from Tet offensive levels. Military liquidified petroleum gas delivery locations increased 32 percent. The arrival of the 259th Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Operating) in I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) increased the number of petroleum operating battalions in the Republic of Vietnam to four; each support command now has one petroleum operating battalion. The arrival of the Program 6 units into the U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang facilitated the release and transfer of TDY truck units to the other support commands

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in accordance with requirement priorities. The longest pipeline system in Vietnam, the 116 mile Qui Nhon - An Khe - Pleiku pipeline was completed and put in service. Alternate methods of petroleum distribution were initiated when normal resupply modes were disrupted by storms during October 1968. Although some Class III distribution problems were encountered during the quarter, all fuel requirements within the Republic of Vietnam were satisfied. Although enemy action against petroleum installations continued, all damage was repaired and full capabilities have been restored.

K. (U) DIRECTORATE OF PROCUREMENT, Annex Q. Purchase Requests and Commitments (PR&C's) processed during the period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968 totaled 476 with a dollar value of \$14.4 million. This brings the total PR&C's for Fiscal Year 1969 to 781 for a value of \$271 million. There are 276 contracts currently being administered by the US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam for a total of \$637 million. The Troop Support Branch, Services Division, has been expanded with the addition of Depot Support Contracts for fixed field maintenance and non-standard repair parts. An intensive program is in effect to place closer supervision on Imprest Funds and eliminate those which are inactive or unnecessary. Fresh fruit and vegetable expenditures have increased considerably with the addition of delivery points in I Corps Tactical Zone for Marine and Navy units. Additional sources of fresh fruit and vegetables are being developed in the Da Nang area. Construction will begin soon on an approved market shed for that area. The effect of a Da Nang Buying Office will be more economical deliveries of fresh fruit and vegetables to I CTZ and improvement in the local economy of the rural Da Nang area. A program of direct delivery by vendor to consumer is in operation by the Saigon Field Office resulting in improved product quality and government savings by the elimination of a depot handling operation.

L. (U) DIRECTORATE OF RETROGRADE AND DISPOSAL, Annex R. During the period 1 August to 31 October 1968, 79,434 short tons of material was retrograded from RVN. Efforts are being made to expand, to all the ports within RVN, the use of Sea-Land Vans for container compatible cargo. Expanded Sea-Land Van service will be advantageous when retrograde material presently being shipped to Okinawa starts going to CONUS. The approval of the Modified Table of Distribution and Allowances (MTDA) and the arrival of a new USAMC retrograde assistance team has improved the personnel problem of the Collection, Classification and Salvage Activities. During the reporting period, the Foreign Excess Sales Office underwent an audit from the Army Audit Agency and completion of a country to country agreement was pursued with the U.S. Embassy. For the month of October a drop in scrap tonnage on hand was realized. This trend is expected to continue through the end of the next reporting period. The sales office offered 318 line items for sale which should produce \$462,334.91 in proceeds. Tonnage removed during the period was 21,371.9 short tons.

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M. (C) DIRECTORATE OF TRANSPORTATION, Annex S. The 1st Logistical Command ports handled an average of 780,676 STONs of cargo per month during the quarter. Individual port records were set during the period by Cam Ranh Bay, Cat Lai, Vung Tau and Dong Tam. The Logistics-Over-The-Shore (LOTS) site at Thon My Thuy (Wunder Beach) was closed on 25 August in anticipation of the forthcoming northern monsoon season. Significant progress was made during the quarter in reducing vessel turnaround time at Cat Lai. The Sea-Land Container Program continued to progress during the quarter and groundwork was laid to expand this service. Approval was granted to add an additional C4J vessel to the CONUS-CRB route. Several additional recommendations were made during the quarter which would significantly increase the scope of Sea-Land service within RVN. Restoration of the Vietnam National Railway System (VNRS) continued as enemy sabotage activities showed a marked decrease. Passenger service for Local Nationals was inaugurated between Chop Chai and Tuy Hoa Air Force Base (AFB) on 1 August 1968. An average of 771,317 STONs of cargo was moved by highway during the period; 474,956 STONs by military vehicles and 296,361 STONs by commercial contract vehicles. The first utilization of Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) aircraft was made on 29 September 1968 from Phu Cat AFB to Red River Army Depot.

N. (U) ADJUTANT GENERAL, Annex T.

O. (U) CHAPLAIN, Annex U. As of 31 October 1968, 1st Logistical Command had a total authorization of 73 chaplains. Sixty-two of these spaces are filled by two Jewish, 46 Protestant and 14 Catholic chaplains. Sixty-nine chaplain assistants are assigned. The average number of services conducted by each chaplain per week was 4.3. A total of 1,829,490 \$VN was donated through chapel offerings during August, September and October 1968. Six requisitions for electronic organs were filled. Seven hundred and four pieces of altar brassware were chromeplated.

P. (C) SIGNAL OFFICE, Annex V. Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM) is being installed in the 1st Logistical Command Headquarters and its four major subordinate commands. Installation of AUTOSEVOCOM at the headquarters is scheduled to be completed in November 1968. The Command Group Key Telephone System is to be expanded to include all the directorates and staff sections upon location of the remaining Bill of Materials. The requirements plan to provide the United States Army Depot, Long Binh with communications during relocation from Saigon to Long Binh is being implemented. Construction on the headquarters Communications Center has progressed and it is expected to be operational by 5 November 1968. Work to up-date the 1st Logistical Command's Signal Operating Instructions/Standing Signal Instructions was initiated in September 1968 and is expected to be completed by 4 November.

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Q. (U) INFORMATION OFFICE, Annex W. During August this office prepared to expand its capabilities to include, for the first time, the production of 16mm motion picture film as a vehicle to publicize command activities. Upgrading the quality of news and photo releases submitted by subordinate commands continues. The 1st Logistical Command continues to be a leader among Army units throughout the world in the number of photo and news releases mailed to the Army Hometown News Center. The US Army Vietnam Daily News Summary submitted to and released by this office reflects a decrease due to personnel turnover throughout the command. The number of press queries received by the command were routine with a few exceptions, which resulted in articles being published in the controversial Overseas Weekly newspaper. Publication of the Vietnam Review, the command newspaper, continues on a monthly basis and subordinate units continue to publish a variety of mimeographed and multilith periodicals reflecting their activities. During September a revision of the 1st Logistical Command magazine was begun and it now has a tentative publication date of December.

R. (U) INSPECTOR GENERAL, Annex X. Inspector General assistance was extended to 539 members of the command. Approximately 44 percent of the requests for assistance received concerned dissatisfaction with assignment, disciplinary matters, promotion and pay. Of the 49 complaints processed, 7 were justified. There were 64 Annual General Inspections conducted, of which 60 of the units inspected received a rating of satisfactory. Supply, maintenance, training and security continued to be major areas of interest.

S. (C) PROVOST MARSHAL, Annex Y. Staff visits to all critical and sensitive 1st Logistical Command installations and activities continues at a steady pace with the addition of a Project 525 Inspection/Training visit program designed to study procedures and controls affecting security of cargo. Provost Marshal offense statistics indicate an increase in offense rates in all categories as compared with fourth quarter, FY 1968 figures. River Patrol Boats are now in operation in the Qui Nhon Port area with further deployment to Vung Ro Bay anticipated in the near future.

T. (U) SPECIAL SERVICES, Annex Z.

U. (U) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE, Annex A'. During the months of August, September and October 1968, this command tried 17 general court-martial cases, 450 special court-martial cases and 121 summary court-martial cases. Nonjudicial punishment was imposed in 4,038 instances. During this period, interviews and documents prepared for legal assistance clients by judge advocates totaled 4,748. Claims for personal property in the amount of \$46,874.12 were paid throughout the last quarter.

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SECTION II

LESSONS LEARNED: OBSERVATIONS
EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. (U) PERSONNEL

1. Additional Department of the Army Civilian (DAC) spaces.

a. OBSERVATION: A manpower survey team evaluated the requirements of the U.S. Army Support Commands (USASUPCOM) and recommended ten additional DAC Ammunition Inspectors be authorized throughout the command. Distribution of these spaces recommended is: four at USASUPCOM, Saigon, two at USASUPCOM, Cam Ranh Bay, and four at USASUPCOM, Qui Nhon.

b. EVALUATION: Large volume turn-over of ammunition, adverse climatic conditions, unimproved storage facilities, ammunition returned to storage sites by using units, and large quantities of retrograde material all produce extra requirements for close surveillance by expert ammunition inspectors. These inspectors assure safety and efficiency of operations through inspection of storage operations, monitoring waiver requirements and training military personnel. The current manning level has been found, through experience, to be inadequate to meet the demands created by conditions in Vietnam.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Action be taken to authorize recruitment of additional DAC inspectors to enhance ammunition operations. (Dir. Ammunition)

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B. (C) OPERATIONS

1. (C) River Patrol Boats (PBR).

a. OBSERVATION: Satisfactory operation of River Patrol Boats (PBR's) for waterborne port security patrols continues for the ports of Vung Tau, Saigon, Newport, Cat Lai and Dong Nai barge complex. PBR's have now been placed in the port of Qui Nhon with additional deployment to Vung Ro Bay anticipated in the near future.

(1) PBR's are currently equipped with the Honeywell 40mm grenade launcher which is mounted "piggyback" over the rear 50 cal machinegun. This system of mounting does not permit simultaneous firing of both weapons.

(2) Starlight scopes and M127 illumination parachute flares were recommended as additions to the combat equipment of PBR's in the Qui Nhon port.

(3) A simplified tactical grid reporting system based on the 1,000 meter UTM grid system has been implemented at Qui Nhon for use on PBR's.

b. EVALUATION:

(1) The Honeywell launcher was removed from the rear 50 cal machinegun and mounted over the AFT cockpit vertical armor plate to allow weapons to be fired individually or simultaneously.

(2) The addition of starlight scopes and illumination flares to PBR's combat equipment further improves the capability of night surveillance of the Qui Nhon port.

(3) The implementation of a simplified grid system allows the pilots of PBR's to report their positions without encoding transmissions, providing additional security to the system while simplifying navigational requirements.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Provost Marshal)

2. (U) Contract Administration.

a. OBSERVATION: In administering several large cost type contracts, it was observed that contractor performance is enhanced by the appointment of full-time Contracting Officers' Representatives (COR's). In several instances, notably the Non-Standard Repair Parts Warehouse and the Engineer Construction Materiel Yard managed and operated by Pacific Architects and Engineers, Inc., problems have developed that could have been precluded by a competent full-time COR.

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b. EVALUATION: The Troop Support Branch, in coordination with the Director of General Supply, 1st Logistical Command, has initiated a review of selected contracts to determine which contracts require a full-time COR.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Dir. Procurement)

3. (C) Line Haul Capability.

a. OBSERVATION: During October, the normal resupply of Ban Me Thout and Cheo Reo by air and Duc Pho by water was interrupted for several weeks. Alternate resupply was initiated utilizing line haul. The An Khe - Pleiku pipeline capability has eliminated the need for two petroleum truck platoons; however, future enemy damage to this pipeline may require a line haul capability to continue distribution from An Khe to Pleiku, Kontum and Dak To.

b. EVALUATION: Because of the flexibility of military line haul, it is a very effective mode for supplementing or replacing other more favored petroleum distribution modes (pipeline, water vessel, or commercial truck). The effectiveness of this alternate mode in this context is predicated upon line haul assets not being completely committed elsewhere. Additionally, experience has shown that stated TOE capabilities for POL truck companies are seriously degraded in Vietnam due to unimproved roads, insecure roads, restriction of operations to daylight hours, and nightly lock-ins.

c. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That future force structure planning consider the benefit of having additional line haul capability to provide back-up for other distribution modes.

(2) That in determining truck unit capabilities, adjustments be made to reflect in-country line haul capabilities as 30 percent of TOE capability and local haul as 50 percent of TOE capability. (Dir. Petroleum)

4. (U) Ammunition Storage Pads and Barricades.

a. OBSERVATION: Storage Pads constructed of concrete provide the most stable, maintenance-free base for the storage of ammunition. Blast protective earth barricades surrounding these pads require some means of stabilization to prevent excessive erosion.

b. EVALUATION: Experience in ammunition storage areas has shown that unimproved pads (e.g. M8A1 matting, stabilized soil surface, crushed rock and asphalt) do not hold up over extended periods of time, especially during the heavy monsoon rains prevalent in Vietnam. Eventually the pads require extensive rehabilitation to prevent the ammunition from becoming partially submerged in water and mud. Constant erosion of surrounding

barricades aggravates the problem. It has been found that concrete is the most durable construction material for storage pads and requires almost no maintenance. To prevent earth barricades from eroding, they should be stabilized, possibly by means of an emulsion of grass seed and fertilizer blended into the barricade surface. This will produce a stabilizing root network to prevent or reduce the erosion.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That a higher priority for the use of construction material and equipment be given to the construction of concrete ammunition storage pads and the stabilization of barricades. (Dir. Ammunition)

5. (U) Materials Handling Equipment (MHE) Safety Device.

a. OBSERVATION: The long tines on the rough terrain forklift frequently damage material behind that being lifted.

b. EVALUATION: Rough terrain forklifts have tines longer than most pallets and crates to be lifted. When one load is being lifted, a crate or pallet behind it is frequently damaged by the protruding tines. To eliminate this problem, a simple standoff frame device was developed in the theater. The device is attached at the rear of the tines and prevents the tines from sliding fully forward, thus eliminating protrusion of the tines.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That consideration be given to using such a device (drawing at Inclosure 10) at all installations experiencing this problem. (Dir. Ammunition)

6. (U) Marking less than full boxes.

a. OBSERVATION: The present method of marking less than full boxes of ammunition with painted gold stripes has proven inadequate for this theater of operations. When exposed to theater weather conditions for relatively short periods of time these markings become extremely difficult to see, resulting in inventory and stock control record errors.

b. EVALUATION: Painting the less than full boxes white in accordance with drawing 8796522 sheet 1 of 2, Revision S, dated 7/21/66 makes identification easier. This method of marking will not be as readily affected by the weather. Subordinate units have been notified of this change in procedure and CONUS installations shipping ammunition to Vietnam have been instructed to comply with the above drawings.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Dir. Ammunition)

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7. (C) Improved Conventional Munitions.

a. OBSERVATION: Enemy action causing the destruction of two Ammunition Supply Points containing Improved Conventional Munitions (ICM) created many problems for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel.

b. EVALUATION: The submissiles which were widely scattered by the explosions are extremely sensitive to disturbance. Many submissiles are buried under other debris from the explosion, making them very difficult to observe. These factors produce unusually hazardous conditions for EOD personnel. Until safer methods of explosion clearance can be developed, one of the two areas concerned is being marked as a mine area and being fenced off. A request for specialized equipment has been submitted to the U.S. Army Materiel Command to facilitate clearing operations. Tests have shown that separate storage of ICM items may reduce the probability of wide distribution of these items, and this method of storage has been directed.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That inexpensive field expedient type methods and shelters be developed for storage of ICM and ICM be stored as a separate compatibility group. (Dir. Ammunition)

8. (U) Return of Packing Materials.

a. OBSERVATION: Unit returns of serviceable Class V packing materials have been insufficient to meet the needs of ammunition units.

b. EVALUATION: Ammunition service units have a mission of repacking considerable quantities of ammunition, both for replacement of unserviceable boxes and for retrograde to CONUS, Japan and Okinawa. It is uneconomical to requisition boxes and pallets from CONUS when ample supplies are available at using units. However, unit returns have not provided an adequate source for these items.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That command attention be directed toward insuring adequate return of items mentioned above. A letter has been distributed notifying units of the specific materials desired for turn-in. (Dir. Ammunition)

C. (U) TRAINING

1. Drivers 64A10 and 64B20 MOS.

a. OBSERVATION: Truck units in RVN are experiencing difficulty training driver replacements from CONUS. Valuable time is required to provide these drivers with training in addition to meeting heavy operational requirements.

b. EVALUATION: Many personnel are arriving in this command carrying 64A10 and 64B20 MOS's without having adequate training in their MOS. Truck units must spend excessive time teaching these drivers fundamentals. Personnel rotations make it difficult for units to insure that qualified senior drivers supervise the training of new personnel. Units are responsible for providing refresher training but should not be burdened with providing extensive basic training.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That CONUS training centers review their training program and try to provide trainees with as much practical driving experience as possible. (Dir. Transportation)

2. Maintenance Personnel training for Marine Equipment procured under Project ENSURE (Expediting Nonstandard Urgent Requirements for Equipment).

a. OBSERVATION: Personnel performing maintenance on standard marine equipment are not familiar with maintenance requirements of the newer, more complex systems of the nonstandard equipment. Some of these systems have not been used on any US Army equipment, for example, the propulsion system used on the River Patrol Boat (PBR).

b. EVALUATION: The continued input of the nonstandard marine equipment without prior training of maintenance personnel has reduced this command's operational capability. The personnel available to be assigned to maintenance units have been trained to perform maintenance on standard watercraft such as Landing Craft Medium (LCM) VIIIIs and Landing Craft Utility (LCU) or, as general mechanics. When special problems develop, solutions are often delayed because of the inability of the maintenance personnel to solve the problem.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That action be taken by U.S. Continental Army Command to train personnel assigned to marine equipment maintenance activities on the operation and maintenance of nonstandard marine equipment. (Dir. Maintenance)

E. (U) LOGISTICS

1. Retrograde by aircraft.

a. OBSERVATION: Backlog of ammunition to be returned to CONUS is a continuing problem for the 1st Logistical Command. Empty CONUS bound aircraft previously were restricted from carrying ammunition components.

b. EVALUATION: Recent removal of these restrictions has made it possible to considerably reduce the backlog of retrograde material and to more efficiently utilize aircraft.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That maximum use be made of empty aircraft returning to CONUS. (Dir. Ammunition)

2. Major Caliber Ammunition Lot Sizes.

a. OBSERVATION: Several lots of major caliber ammunition (notably 105mm cartridges) have been received in quantities of considerably more than 100,000 rounds.

b. EVALUATION: If a malfunction or serious defect is discovered in one or more rounds of ammunition, the entire lot of that ammunition is suspended from use. With large lot sizes of 100,000 rounds or more, a suspension could cause a serious disruption in the supply system. The seriousness of this problem is further compounded by the limited storage capacity of ammunition supply points.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That lots of major caliber ammunition should in no case exceed 50,000 rounds. This matter has been brought to the attention of the U.S. Army Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency (USASPSA). (Dir. Ammunition)

3. Disposal of Excess Contractor Supplies.

a. OBSERVATION: Supply excesses generated by the phase down of the construction contractor, RMA-ERJ, cannot be easily integrated into depot stocks since the supplies are not identified by Federal Stock Number.

b. EVALUATION: Contractor excess supplies can provide a source for construction materials and supplies which are in short supply at the depots. Lists of these excesses were furnished to the USAICCV. Except in a few instances, however, the supplies could not be identified by Federal Stock Number. The manpower needed to identify the supplies, item by item, with a Federal Stock Number would be excessive. Therefore, the

lists of supplies were rejected although some of the supplies could have been used.

c. RECOMMENDATIONS: That in future contracts requiring the contractor to provide his own supplies, a requirement be included in the contract for the contractor to identify all of his supplies by Federal Stock Number in addition to any numbering system he may use for his own purposes.
(Dir. Engineering)

4. Technical Inspection of Gun, Field Artillery, Self-Propelled, 175MM, M107, and Howitzer, Heavy, Self-Propelled, 8 inch, M110.

a. OBSERVATION: The deadline rate for subject weapons, while within the MACV objective of less than 15 percent, is consistently high when compared to deadline rates for other artillery. In order to determine the underlying causes of the relatively high deadline rate, four teams of United States Army Weapons Command and United States Army Tank Automotive Command Field Maintenance Technicians were organized. Each team was assigned the mission of performing a technical inspection of all of the subject weapons within one of the four support command areas. The inspections were performed during the period 26 August 1968 to 16 September 1968 and revealed the following major problem areas:

(1) Fire Control and Instrumentation. Many optical elements in the sights were found to be fogged with moisture and fungus growth. Electrical wiring was deteriorated and in poor condition.

(2) Load rammers were in poor condition.

(3) Thirty-nine weapons were determined by age or number of tube changes to be due for retrograde to CONUS rebuild facilities. A review of the deadline reports revealed that these weapons were accounting for a substantial portion of the deadline days.

b. EVALUATION: Unclassified message AVCA GM-FM, 36963, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, DTG 250643Z September 1968, subject: Air Shipment of Artillery Fire Control Equipment, directed that emphasis be placed on rapid evacuation by registered airmail of fire control instruments which cannot be repaired in country. Strict control of fire control instruments by using specified direct exchange points was also directed by this message. Equipment Improvement Requests and letters have been submitted to the Weapons Command describing failures experienced on the loader rammer assembly. Messages were sent to the support commands requesting that coordination be made with artillery units to insure that guns eligible for retrograde were placed on a priority basis as new assets arrive in country. A group of Field Maintenance Technicians and enlisted personnel

qualified on subject weapons has been formed into a Technical Assistance Team. Its mission will be to provide on-site training to organizational and direct support maintenance personnel. They will inspect units' Authorized Stockage Lists and Prescribed Load Lists to insure that a sufficient quantity of repair parts is on hand.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Command emphasis should be placed on the rapid retrograde of fire control instruments. Emphasis must be placed on the importance of submitting an EIR each time an item of equipment fails. Command emphasis should be placed on preventive maintenance and organizational maintenance and a quarterly maintenance program emphasized. (Dir. Maintenance)

4. Publications for Nonstandard Marine Equipment.

a. OBSERVATION: Maintenance publications for Johnson Outboard Motors, River Patrol Boats (RPB) and Hurricane Aircat Boats are not available. Only commercial manuals are available and these are unsatisfactory.

b. EVALUATION: The lack of appropriate manuals for marine equipment is continually reducing this command's operational capability. Urgent action is warranted to insure that DA publications are made available for guidance in operation, maintenance, and repair parts supply.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That immediate action be taken to provide manuals for nonstandard marine equipment, and that in the future, when new equipment is introduced, manuals be provided when the equipment is furnished. (Dir. Maintenance)

5. Dependence on Civilian Personnel.

a. OBSERVATION: The necessity for dependence on civilian contract personnel in this theater could be alleviated through the use of manufacturer - trained military personnel.

b. EVALUATION: The annual funds put aside for the accomplishment of an office machine repair capability within Vietnam totals approximately \$302,100. Manufacturers of equipment such as Frieden, National Cash Register, Addressograph-Multigraph and AB Dick Corporation provide the civilian market with factory-trained technicians. In the case of Addressograph-Multigraph and AB Dick Corporations, this training is at no cost to the government. In a combat environment it is not always possible to move civilian technicians into areas where deadlined equipment is located. The reaction time from the time an item is reported for repair until the time the contractor arrives at the work site is considered excessive--especially in I and II Corps Tactical Zones. The contractor

charges for a preventive maintenance program are considered excessive since many times the item of equipment may only require cleaning and adjustment. Contractor labor charges begin while the technicians are awaiting government transportation at aerial ports of embarkation. Due to schedule procedures many hours are wasted.

c. RECOMMENDATION: CONUS schools which train personnel for office machine repair should include courses applicable to equipment being used in Vietnam. Close cooperation between personnel agencies in CONUS and RVN should insure that personnel being assigned to RVN are allocated to units having office machine repair capability. With the above actions completed, a minimum dependence upon civilian contractors will result. (Dir. Maintenance)

7. Liquidation of Excess FY Funds.

a. OBSERVATION: Operations and Maintenance, Army (O&MA) FY funds not contractually obligated by 30 June 1968 are no longer available. In order to assure necessary funds to cover invoices against certain type contracts, e.g., indefinite quantity, which may be received for payment after 30 June, the Contracting Officer must obligate adequate FY funds prior to that date.

b. EVALUATION: In the past, funds have been obligated in excess of actual contractual payment requirements thereby creating a need for deobligation. Timely submission of invoices and more accurate estimates of necessary contract obligations can preclude much of the excess fund accumulation.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That not later than the beginning of the fourth quarter of the fiscal year, Contracting Officers accurately estimate funds required and deobligate excess funds by contractual modification at that time. (Dir. Procurement)

8. Advance Procurement Planning.

a. OBSERVATION: The purpose of the Advance Procurement Plan is to systematically schedule pre-contract actions to effect the correct type contract which is in the best interest of the government. Procurement requests and commitments (PR&C's) must be received by the Procuring Activity in or before the date indicated.

b. EVALUATION: Late receipt of PR&C's compresses the procurement plan schedule with a detrimental effect on the procurement. In addition to pre-contract time reductions, the contractor's mobilization time may be reduced preventing maximum capability early in the contract fiscal year period.

Furthermore, the advantages of competitive procurement may be limited or even lost by late receipt of PR&C's.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Requiring activities must recognize the need to conduct preplanning and obtain all necessary approvals and funding in order to assure early receipt by the procuring activity on or before the scheduled date. (Dir. Procurement)

9. Removal Delay from Property Disposal Yards.

a. OBSERVATION: Large quantities of property are being retained in yards long beyond normal removal time due to extensions granted.

b. EVALUATION: In many instances, extensions have been granted to buyers who have claimed difficulty in obtaining bonded area or to buyers who are encountering difficulty in obtaining sub-purchasers for their items. Allegations by buyers have been generally accepted without requirement for proof of attempts to obtain storage space, and, as a result, certain buyers have been using the disposal yards as free storage areas. As a result, extensions will be granted only in event of bonafide causes such as tactical considerations which actually preclude removal. Well documented and fully justified written application for extensions in cases of other actual problems may be considered, but extensions will be granted as an exception, rather than a rule.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Dir. Retrograde and Disposal)

10. Reduction of Free Removal Period in Property Disposal Yards.

a. OBSERVATION: Property Disposal Yards are becoming filled to capacity. A major contributing factor to this is the long free removal periods granted in the contract.

b. EVALUATION: In March 1967, analysis of contractor problems with GVN indicated that a 30 day removal period was unrealistic, and frequent extensions needed to be granted. At that time, it was decided to increase removal times to aid the contractors. In the 18 months since the longer removal time was instituted, it has been found that contractors merely consider that they have a longer amount of time before the contracting officer presses them for action. As a result, property sits in the yard untouched and extensions are requested regardless of the length of the removal period. Revised policy is that free removal period is being reduced to 30 days on new contracts.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Dir. Retrograde and Disposal)

11. Improvement of Directory Service.

a. OBSERVATION:

(1) On 8 August 1968 COMUSMACV directed that every effort be made to forward mail to the addressee and barred "No Record" mail from being returned to sender. On 12 August 1968 the AG, 1st Logistical Command directed the implementation of a new procedure to insure delivery of mail to all personnel in RVN. Since any new procedure would have put an undue burden on the Area Postal Directory, a special task force was established to screen "No Record Mail" against the current USARV Alpha Roster in an effort to deliver mail. Lists were prepared for personnel who had mail where no valid address could be found. These lists were distributed to all commanders in an effort to locate addressees and obtain a "good" locator card on them.

(2) Messages and command letters were sent to all 1st Logistical Command units emphasizing the importance of submission of locator cards on newly arrived personnel. This headquarters directed Personnel Service Companies to prepare a locator card on each newly arrived person as part of the individual's in-processing and to forward these cards daily to the Area Postal Directory. A postal Non-Commissioned Officer was attached to the IG Team to carry the word to the unit level, to include Company Commanders, Unit Postal Officers and Unit Mail Clerks, on the importance of their postal responsibilities for the processing of mail and submission of locator cards.

(3) A Unit Mail Clerk Test Number 1 was distributed to all 1st Logistical Command postal activities in an effort to improve the caliber of unit mail clerks. An individual must now pass this test prior to appointment as a Unit Mail Clerk.

b. EVALUATION: These specific actions have assisted in reducing the backlog of undeliverable mail and decreasing time for redirecting mail for newly arrived personnel and in-country transfers.

c. RECOMMENDATION. None. (Adjutant General)

12. Jewish Religious Holiday Supplies.

a. OBSERVATION: The Staff Chaplain, 1st Logistical Command, initiated requisitions for Jewish Kosher food and supplies for observance of High Holy Day and Day of Atonement Break-The-Fast Dinner on 2 October 1968. All food and supplies were received in amounts adequate for High Holy Day services and activities. On 30 September 1968, the Staff Chaplain, 1st Logistical Command, consolidated and computed requirements for the Jewish Kosher food and supplies for observance of Passover Holy Days (2-3 April 1969) by all Army, Air Force, and Navy Jewish personnel in Vietnam. MILSTHIP requisitions for wine and requisitions for noncatalogued nonstandard subsistence items

were submitted to the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Department of the Army.

b. EVALUATION: In the past several years, the Staff Chaplain, United States Army, Ryukyu Islands, had assumed the responsibility for consolidating and requisitioning the Passover supplies for all Armed Forces Jewish personnel in RVN. This year, however, a change was put into effect whereby support for all in-country Armed Forces Jewish personnel would be provided by 1st Logistical Command.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That 1st Logistical Command continue to consolidate and requisition all specialized food and supply requirements for RVN. The presence of the senior Jewish Chaplain in RVN on the staff of Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command will facilitate timely accomplishment of this action. (Chaplain)

13. Chromeplating of Chapel Brassware.

a. OBSERVATION: Chapel brassware has been rendered obsolete by recently established DA chrome standards. That chapel brassware which is in stock or in use in theater has deteriorated rapidly due to climatic conditions in RVN.

b. EVALUATION: An initial contract was made for chromeplating 100 sets of brass altarware and completed at end of FY 68. This worked out so well that another contract was made to complete chromeplating the balance of chapel brassware in-country.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Chaplain)

14. Maintenance of Small Electronic Organs (Organ Electric: 24 volts DC, 115 volts AC, folding type, 49 Keys, FSN 7710-965-4917).

a. OBSERVATION: There has been a high incidence of maintenance problems experienced in utilization of this instrument. A number of instruments have been found to be unserviceable at the time of receipt by requisitioning unit; others have become unserviceable soon after their first use.

b. EVALUATION: This problem continues to hamper chapel programs. After 25 November 1968, maintenance manuals will be made available by AMC, and a list of spare parts compiled. Maintenance personnel will be trained when manuals are available.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Curtailment of CONUS requisitions of this instrument should be continued pending favorable resolution of current maintenance problems. (Chaplain)

F. (U) ORGANIZATION

1. Unit Control and Efficiency.

a. OBSERVATION: Ammunition supply units not attached to an Ordnance Battalion lack sufficient command control and technical supervision to function effectively.

b. EVALUATION: Some Ammunition Supply Points have been operated by Ordnance units attached to tactical units rather than a technically qualified higher headquarters, e.g., Ordnance Battalions (Ammo). The Technical Inspection Program, initiated by the Director of Ammunition in September 1968 disclosed that these units do not meet standards of safety and efficiency. Action has been taken to transfer some of these units to the control of Ordnance Battalions. The quality of safety and the efficiency in those units already placed under the command and control of technically qualified Ordnance Battalions (Ammo) have greatly increased.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Dir. Ammunition)

G. (U) OTHER

1. Interservice Support Agreements.

a. OBSERVATION: Documentation and subsequent billing of reimbursable issues of supplies below depot level continues to be a problem. The present system of billing other services for supplies based on documentation from the supporting unit has been in effect for 16 months and while the volume of documentation and subsequent billings has increased considerably during this period, actual collections continue to lag. For example, during Fiscal Year 1968 approximately \$35 million in billings were processed applicable to Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) funds of which approximately \$22 million has been rejected by the customer and is uncollectable.

b. EVALUATION: This rejection is due primarily to the incompatibility of in-country accounting systems between services and the illegibility of documentation prepared under adverse working conditions. This is evidenced by the numerous requests from customers for additional information to permit identification. In most instances this information is either not available or requires a costly and time consuming search of records to provide information which was not required by the agreement.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That an effort be made to effect reimbursement at departmental level based on troop strength, equipment densities, and demand intelligence. (ACofS. Comptroller)

2. Finance Sections.

a. OBSERVATION: Effective 1 August, HQ, USARV assumed operational control of the 7th, 10th, 13th, 22nd, 92nd, and 292nd Finance Sections and assigned the Central Finance and Accounting Office (CF&AO) to this command, less operational control. On 1 October, the numbered units were reassigned to this command for operational control and the CF&AO was reassigned to USARV.

b. EVALUATION: Assignment of the Central Finance and Accounting Office to 1st Logistical Command less operational control did not create an advantage and did create distinct disadvantages. While USARV assigned missions, they could not control capability of the office without coordination with this headquarters. The USARV requirements for support of that office created a problem for the logistical and personnel support of other finance sections. Assumption of operational control of the numbered finance sections by USARV created serious control problems, particularly in the fields of communication and technical and officer efficiency ratings. With operational control at USARV, all finance sections were entitled to communicate directly with that headquarters. This headquarters was responsible for officer and technical efficiency

ratings. Obviously, officers and offices cannot reasonably receive their direction from one headquarters and their efficiency ratings from another without a division of interests. The assumption of operational control of these finance units by USARV also deprived the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command of any prerogative of relocating these units or realigning their mission in support of his troops.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That Finance Sections remain assigned to the 1st Logistical Command for operational control and that the command remain responsive to requirements of USARV headquarters. That the Central Finance and Accounting Office function, which serves finance sections of this command as well as those of the division finance offices, remain assigned to USARV headquarters and get its support through the same source as USARV headquarters. (ACofS, Comptroller)

d. Southeast Asia (SEA) Huts.

a. OBSERVATION: Units deployed to Vietnam and based at installations where only USARV Field Standards of construction are authorized have been utilizing tentage with wood frames and wood floors for troop housing and unit administration. These tents have proven unsatisfactory for long occupancy, especially during the wet season, and their continued use has resulted in instances of lowered morale and the temptation to engage in unauthorized construction.

b. EVALUATION: It was observed that field standard troop housing for Navy forces was provided in I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) by the use of Southeast Asia huts, a hutment 16' x 32' replacing the standard framed tent and consisting of wood frame, sides, doors and floor, and a peaked metal roof. A study conducted on cost comparisons showed that the materials for each SEA Hut were cheaper than tentage and supporting materials by nearly \$200 per unit. Once furnished the materials, units were able to erect the SEA Huts rapidly on a self-help basis. USARV approved this command's proposal for use of Southeast Asia Huts in lieu of framed tents since the resulting facilities are not only cheaper but are more durable and provide much more satisfactory living conditions for the occupants.

c. RECOMMENDATION:

(1) That framed tent accommodations at field standard bases throughout RVN be upgraded by the use of SEA Huts.

(2) That units programmed into field standard installations and expected to remain more than six months be furnished SEA Huts in lieu of framed tentage. (Dir. Engineering)

4. Protective Structures.

a. OBSERVATION: The practice of using sandbags for permanent bunkers and revetments has proven to be extremely unsatisfactory.

b. EVALUATION: Sandbags deteriorate rapidly and structures must be rebuilt frequently. This wastes manpower and money and is bad for morale. Bin-type structures filled with sand or compacted earth have been developed and information on how to construct them has been disseminated to all 1st Logistical Command units. A 24-man bunker costs about \$2,500 more to build with sandbags than with earthfilled bins.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That USARV develop specifications for earthfilled bin-type bunkers and revetments and direct that they be used country-wide for permanent structures in lieu of sandbags. A letter requesting this action has been forwarded to USARV. (Dir. Engineering)

5. Stabilization of Berms.

a. OBSERVATION: Unstabilized ammunition storage pad berms erode rapidly, especially during heavy monsoon rains, causing maintenance and operational problems.

b. EVALUATION: Erosion can be prevented on a self-help basis by planting Bermuda grass. Units can obtain seed and fertilizer from the local Post Engineer. While peneprime has been used with some success to stabilize berms for short periods, for most soils peneprime treatment is an inferior method compared to a good grass cover. Instructions for berm stabilization were disseminated in the Commander's Conference Notes and will be the subject of an Engineer Information Letter.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Dir. Engineering)

6. Solatium payments.

a. OBSERVATION: Prompt solatium payments are to be made in accordance with USARV Regulation 27-4 when it is known that U.S. personnel are involved in an accident or incident in which a local national is injured or killed, or suffers property damage. In some cases, unit commanders are not making solatium payments until weeks after an incident. In a few cases, no solatium was paid.

b. EVALUATION: Some commanders are under the mistaken impression that solatium payments can only be paid when the fault or liability on the part of U.S. personnel has been established by clear and convincing evidence. Other commanders are not aware of the requirement for speedy payment of solatium. The question of whether there is

liability or fault on the part of U.S. personnel involved is immaterial. A solatium payment is simply an expression of regret similiar to the American custom of sending flowers to a hospital patient or to a funeral. In Vietnam, solatium is a traditional courtesy and implies sympathy toward the victim or his survivors. Failure to make prompt payment may be taken as a discourtesy or insult, thereby creating local ill will towards our mission in Vietnam. The provisions of USARV Regulation 27-4 and the requirement for prompt and expeditious payment of solatium are being stressed at all levels of the command.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Staff Judge Advocate)

SECTION III, HEADQUARTERS DA SURVEY INFORMATION

1. References:

a. Paragraph 12a(3), AR 525-15, Operational Reports-Lessons Learned, 26 January 1968.

b. Paragraph 5b(3), USARV Regulation 525-15, Operational Reports-Lessons Learned, 13 April 1968.

c. USARV Letter, Subject: Operations Report-Lessons Learned: Escape and Evasion Information, 6 August 1968.

2. Negative report is submitted for Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command.

All Annexes wd Hq, DA
Incl 1-9, 11, 12 wd Hq, DA

AVHGC-DST (13 Nov 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 4 DEC 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning additional Department of the Army Civilian (DAC) spaces, page 15, paragraph A1. Concur with the recommendation. A USARV Civilian Personnel Voucher authorizing recruitment authority for 11 additional DAC Ammunition Inspectors is presently being staffed in Hqs, USARV. It is expected that Hqs, 1st Logistical Command will receive the approved USARV Civilian Personnel Voucher during December 1968 granting authority to recruit the DAC Ammunition Inspectors.

b. Reference item concerning line haul capability, page 18, paragraph B3. The 1st Logistical Command has been advised to take action to determine what future line haul capability is required and at the appropriate time, forward a request for space financing of the requirement to Hqs, USARV.

c. Reference item concerning ammunition storage pads and barricades, page 18, paragraph B4. Nonconcur with the recommendation. Ammunition storage pads are designed to meet a particular need, primarily to withstand maximum loading conditions. The optimum design is determined by the strength and characteristics of the local soil and available base course materials. Therefore, the optimum design must be accomplished on a case by case basis, and it is not feasible or austere to standardize a particular type of surfacing for ammunition storage.

d. Reference item concerning materials handling equipment (MHE) safety device, page 19, paragraph B5: Concur.

e. Reference item concerning improved conventional munitions (ICM), page 20, paragraph B7: nonconcur. Messages from this headquarters require ICM items to be stored separately from other munitions. This requirement is also being added to USARV Reg 700-7. The recommendation for a higher headquarters to develop field expedients for ammunition storage is not appropriate.

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f. Reference item concerning return of packing materials, page 20, paragraph B8: concur. In addition to the 1st Logistical Command action, this headquarters dispatched a message to major commands requesting items to be turned in to ASP's or ammunition depots. Subsequent reminders will be dispatched as appropriate.

g. Reference item concerning drivers 64A10 and 64B20 MOS, page 21, paragraph C1: concur. This is a matter of concern for higher headquarters.

h. Reference item concerning maintenance personnel training for marine equipment procured under Project ENSURE, page 21, paragraph C2. This is a matter of concern for higher headquarters.

i. Reference item concerning retrograde by aircraft, page 25, paragraph E1: concur. Removal of restrictions concerning retrograde of ammunition to CONUS has eliminated the problem.

j. Reference item concerning major caliber ammunition lot sizes, page 25, paragraph E2: concur. A munitions conference was held at the US Army Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency, 20-22 November 1968. The matter was discussed and efforts will be made to reduce lot sizes.

k. Reference item concerning tech insp of gun, field artillery, SP, 175mm, M107 and Howitzer, Heavy, SP, 8 inch, M110, page 26, paragraph E4: concur. PM and the submission of EIR's will continue to be emphasized by this headquarters. The Quarterly Maintenance Program (Tech Inspection and Maint) is being implemented in XXIV CTZ, Americal Div, and IFFV. The 177th Ord Det is developing fire control instrument purging and repair capability. Representatives of this headquarters will also visit units of the command on a periodic basis.

l. Reference item concerning liquidation of excess FY funds, page 28, paragraph E7. Nonconcur with the recommendation. Contracting officers should not wait until the beginning of the fourth quarter of the fiscal year to accurately estimate funds required and take deobligation action on excess funds (AR 37-21, paragraph 6e). Once the obligation has been established, contracting officers should continually review the progress of the contract and submit deobligation action at any time excess funds are identified. Funds should never be obligated in excess of the actual contracted payment requirements (AR 37-21, paragraph 8c). The 1st Logistical Command will be requested to review obligation procedures to insure compliance with the appropriate regulations.

m. Reference item concerning advance procurement planning, page 28, paragraph E8: concur. A letter from this headquarters to all subordinate commands requested the establishment of target dates for submission of major contracts. This implemented USARPAC Reg 700-7.

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n. Reference item concerning Jewish Religious Holiday Supplies, page 30, paragraph E12: concur with first part of recommendation that 1st Logistical Command consolidate all specialized food and supply requirements for RVN. Nonconcur with second part of recommendation that the presence of the senior Jewish chaplain in RVN on the Staff of Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command will facilitate timely accomplishment of this action. There exists no specific requirement that a Jewish chaplain be assigned to the Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command because subject consolidation can be accomplished equally as well by a chaplain of any faith by coordination with Jewish chaplains serving in Vietnam.

o. Reference item concerning interservice support agreements, page 35, paragraph G1. Concur with the recommendation. The statement in paragraph G1a that "\$22 million has been rejected by the customer and is uncollectable" is misleading. This headquarters has recently assumed responsibility for settlement of contested billings and only those that cannot be resolved in-country will be transferred to the Finance and Accounting Office, US Army, as uncollectable. Anticipated changes in documentation processing as well as increased command emphasis on proper document preparation will reduce many of the existing problems.

p. Reference item concerning Finance Sections, page 35, paragraph G2. Concur with the recommendation. No further action is required.

q. Reference item concerning Southeast Asia (SEA) Huts, page 36, paragraph G3. Concur with the recommendations. These recommendations have already been implemented by USARV.

r. Reference item concerning protective structures, page 37, paragraph G4: concur. Standardized plans for bin type bunkers are presently being produced and will be distributed to the two engineer brigades. After the distribution of these plans, a message will be dispatched to all commands encouraging the use of this type of bunker in lieu of sandbag bunkers. The use of bin type revetments will also be encouraged; however, the vast number of possible sizes and shapes make standardized plans unfeasible.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


W. C. ARNTZ
C-AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

GPOP-DT (13 Nov 68) 2d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Log Comd for Period Ending
31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

22 JAN 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed. Additional information is provided below.
2. Reference 1st Indorsement paragraph 2a: A requisition covering a total of eleven Ammunition Inspection Specialist positions was received on 9 December 1968 and forwarded by this headquarters to the CO, Savannah Army Depot for filling.
3. Reference 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2o:
 - a. The principal area in which difficulty has been experienced in collecting for interservice support has been Vietnam. Although reimbursement for supplies is required by DOD policy it has been extremely difficult in the past to get all required documentation out of the country so that billings could be prepared.
 - b. There have been several recent major improvements in procedures pertaining to collections for support provided in Vietnam. A proposal which was initiated by USARPAC almost two years ago to bill for POL on a basis of the Monthly Bulk Fuels report has recently been adopted by all Services at Departmental level. As a result, billing for POL consumed in Vietnam is now accomplished at Departmental level on a basis of the reported overall volume of fuel consumed by each Service during the preceding month. This eliminates local POL billing entirely and does away with the necessity for collecting, pricing and vouchering hundreds of individual issue slips.
 - c. In a separate action arising from the Worldwide Ammunition Conference, agreement has been reached whereby ammunition issued to 7th Air Force in Vietnam is now being billed at Departmental level. One reason for Departmental level billing is that Air Force will replace some of the ammunition in kind and APSA will bill only for the net amount. Billing will be based on the Ammunition Report prepared

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Log Comd for Period Ending
31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

in RVN and validated by both Army and Air Force. This report will then serve as a voucher for settlement of all claims. Another ammunition conference is scheduled for January and at that time efforts will be made to reach the same arrangement with Navy and Marines.

d. The third area, currently in negotiation, will provide for billing for subsistence issues on a basis of the bulk subsistence issues report. This, like the ammunition and POL arrangements, will eliminate the necessity for individual vouchers and issue slips. Billing will be accomplished at USARPAC level. It is understood that both Navy and Air Force at Departmental level have agreed in principle to this concept and it is anticipated an operational agreement will be reached at an early date.


e. The centralized billing concept to be based on a single validated report each for POL, ammunition, and subsistence leaves only the area of general supplies under the old system. While no specific action is afoot at this time, so far as is known, to provide a similar arrangement for general supplies it is possible that a centralized billing concept may be developed in the future. The principal stumbling block appears to be the lack of any coordinated bulk report similar to those for Class II, Class I, and Class V items. The elimination of the administration involved in documenting individual issues for other items, however, should contribute to easing the overall problem of handling documentation for general supplies.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:





C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

SAFETY DEVICE, ROUGH TERRAIN FORKLIFT



INCLOSURE 10
2 REQUIRED/FORKLIFT:
1 ON EACH TINE, HELD IN
PLACE BY SET SCREWS
AND BANDING MATERIAL



MATERIAL: .25" PLATE STEEL 35

* .375" SET SCREW

NOT TO SCALE

TNCL 10

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